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Spite and Development 
ERNST FEHR, KARLA HOFF AND MAYURESH KSHETRAMADE 
The disparity in the performance of economies and the 
persistence of disparate economies through time have not been 
satisfactorily explained by development economists. … what 
has been missing is an understanding of the nature of human 
coordination and cooperation (Douglas North, 1990, p. 11). 
 
Effective institutions for contract enforcement and collective action are probably among the most 
important conditions for successful economic and social development. However, in many 
developing countries these institutions are weak and agreements lacking formal third party 
enforcement are ubiquitous. Under these conditions, endogenous contract enforcement and the 
ability of private parties to solve the cooperation and coordination problems inherent in collective 
action are key. A large body of experimental evidence suggests that social preferences are vital to 
solving such problems.1 In particular, the willingness to punish cheaters in informal agreements 
even at a net cost to the punisher substantially reduces cheating (E. Fehr, S. Gächter and G. 
Kirchsteiger, 1997), and the willingness to altruistically punish free riders in public goods greatly 
enhances the scope of private parties to solve collective action problems (E. Fehr and S. Gächter, 
2002). Likewise, many people exhibit a propensity to cooperate conditional on others’ 
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Switzerland (email: efehr@iew.uzh.ch); Hoff: The World Bank (email: khoff@worldbank.org); Kshetramade: 
Affinnova Inc, Waltham, MA (email: mayurvk@yahoo.com). We gratefully acknowledge support from the Research 
Priority Program on the “Foundations of Human Social Behavior” at the University of Zurich (Fehr) and from the 
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Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism." Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 54, pp. 
1-24, Carpenter, Jeffrey. "The Demand for Punishment." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2007, 62, 
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2006, 312, pp. 108-11, Ostrom, E.; Walker, J. and Gardner, R. "Covenants with and without a Sword - Self-
Governance Is Possible." American Political Science Review, 1992, 86(2), pp. 404-17.. 
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cooperation even when free-riding would maximize their material payoff (U. Fischbacher et al., 
2001).  
In this paper we document, however, that social preferences may also constitute important 
obstacles to development. We show, in particular, that spiteful preferences – the desire to reduce 
another’s material payoff for the mere purpose of being ahead of the other – are surprisingly 
widespread in experiments we conducted in one of the least developed regions in India (Uttar 
Pradesh). Our results suggest that spitefulness diminishes the propensity to cooperate, even in 
those situations in which mutual cooperation is an equilibrium for selfish players. Finally, we 
find empirical patterns suggesting that the willingness to reduce another’s material payoff – either 
for the sake of achieving more equality or for the sake of being ahead – is stronger among 
individuals belonging to high castes than among those belonging to low castes.  
The last finding is of particular interest because individuals’ caste status can be considered 
as exogenous – individuals cannot freely select into different castes but inherit the caste status of 
their parents.2 For this reason, and because we control for demographic variables such as 
education, land ownership, and house type, our finding may represent the impact of a caste 
culture that put extreme emphasis on the superiority of the high castes and the inferiority of the 
low castes.3 It seems quite plausible that such a culture contributes to social preferences such as 
the motive to be superior in terms of material payoff even when this comes at a cost to equality 
and efficiency.  
                                                 
2 Also, the assignment of different social groups and individuals to the two extreme ends of the caste hierarchy 
generally occurred so long ago (at least a millennium, possibly two) that any cultural differences across castes at the 
extreme ends of the caste hierarchy that may have determined that assignment should have by now been erased 
unless they were reinforced by the socioeconomic regime in which the caste groups have lived. 
3 The Indian caste system represents an extreme form of social hierarchy. High castes traditionally could command 
forced labor from low caste individuals. Low castes are those groups that have been denied basic rights and were 
subject to the traditional practice of untouchability.   
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I. The Role of Spite in Cooperation and Punishment 
In symmetric public goods experiments, players have the same endowments and the same 
material payoff functions. Free-riders earn a higher material payoff than cooperators in this 
setting. If a punishment opportunity is introduced such that individuals are first informed about 
other group members’ contributions to the public good, and can subsequently target punishment 
to specific individuals, many cooperators punish the free riders (Fehr and Gächter 2002). Such 
punishment occurs despite the fact that the punisher has to pay for sanctioning others. However, 
there is also evidence indicating that some free-riders punish the cooperators. For example, in a 
symmetric one-shot public goods experiment with a punishment opportunity (Armin Falk et al., 
2005), roughly 13% of the subjects free ride and punish the cooperators. Interestingly, this 
punishment occurs only if the cost for the punisher is smaller than the cost for the punished 
subject, i.e., only if the free riders can increase the difference in material payoffs between 
themselves and the punished subjects. If instead, every $1 invested in punishment reduces the 
punished subject’s income by $1, spiteful punishment completely vanishes. This finding is 
consistent with the view that free riders who punish want to increase the payoff difference 
between themselves and the cooperators.  
Social psychologists also have found evidence for spiteful preferences (Paul A. M. van 
Lange, 1999). Van lange examined the social preferences of more than 2000 subjects in the 
Netherlands with the ring test (W. B. G. Liebrand and C. G. Mcclintock, 1988) and found that 
roughly 12-13% of them are willing to pay for increasing inequality. These subjects prefer, for 
example, the allocation (480 for self, 80 for other) relative to the allocation (540 for self, 280 for 
other), thus sacrificing total surplus and equality for the sake of a larger payoff difference 
between “self” and “other.” 
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In a wide variety of settings, spiteful preferences would constitute an obstacle to trade, 
cooperation and, thus, development. A spiteful individual is willing to forgo material gains from 
trade unless the terms of trade give him a large share of the pie. A spiteful individual is also more 
likely to violate contracts – either by providing low effort or low quality or by a lower 
willingness to pay the bill – because such contract violations increase the shirker’s payoff at the 
expense of the trading partner. If spiteful shirking is anticipated, it will further decrease the 
willingness to trade. A spiteful individual is harder to motivate to cooperate because he has a 
higher marginal cost of contributing to public goods or joint activities: First, he bears the 
pecuniary costs like all other individuals and, second, he has a nonpecuniary cost because any 
contribution may reduce the difference in material payoffs between himself and others. Finally, 
spiteful punishment also has a detrimental impact on cooperation because it diminishes the net 
incentive for cooperation that emerges from the punishment of defectors. If defection and 
cooperation are punished, the potential free-riders have less incentive to cooperate. In fact, 
Gächter and Hermann provide evidence from experiments in Russia indicating that punishment 
opportunities may fail to reduce free-riding because of the punishment of cooperators (Simon 
Gächter and Benedikt Hermann, 2007).  
II. Spiteful Punishment in India 
We conducted a sequential, one-shot, exchange game with third party punishment in Uttar 
Pradesh in order to study the potential impact of an extreme social hierarchy on the willingness of 
a disinterested party to punish violations of informal agreements. In our experiment three players 
– A, B and C – are involved and they have an endowment of 50, 50 and 100 rupees, respectively. 
50 rupees are roughly equal to one day’s unskilled wage. Players A and B are involved in a 
binary trust game, with A in the role of the trustor and B in the role of the trustee. Player C is the 
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third party who has the option of punishing B. In this game, A can keep his endowment (and then 
the game ends) or he can send it to the trustee. If A sends his endowment to B, the experimenter 
triples the amount sent. At this point B has 200 rupees, which he can either keep for himself or 
share equally with the trustor. In the case that B shares the money with A, all three players have 
100 rupees if player C, the third party, does not punish. In the case that B keeps all the money, 
the distribution of payoffs before player C’s choice is (0, 200, 100).  
Player C has more than two choices. For every two-rupee coin that C spends on 
punishment, Player B loses a 10 rupee note. We asked C to make a choice for the case where B 
keeps all the money and also for the case where B shares the money with A. C made this choice 
before he knew B’s decision. This game captures a feature of many market exchanges and 
investment decisions, namely, that in order to obtain a social surplus, an individual exposes 
himself to the risk of opportunism. Since the game is played one-shot and the players who 
interact in the game are drawn from different villages whose names are never revealed, it is never 
in the self-interest of C to punish B. Thus, punishment represents some kind of social preference.  
The rules of the game were explained to the subjects at great length. Subjects who did not 
pass a basic test of comprehension of the rules did not go on to participate in the game. Because 
we were interested in the role of caste status on the punishment of defection, we implemented 
four treatment conditions with a different composition of high (H) and low (L) castes, where the 
last names indicated a player’s caste: HHH (all three players are from H), HLH (only B is from a 
low caste), LLL (all three players are from L), and LHL (only B is from a high caste). In total, 
621 adult male players participated with 205 players in the role of player C. We find significant 
differences in altruistic punishment across treatment groups, which enable us to discriminate 
between the caste culture hypothesis, the caste conflict hypothesis, and the caste submission 
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hypothesis.4 These results are documented and discussed in depth in (Karla Hoff et al., 2007). In 
addition, we find a surprisingly large number of cases in which third parties punished cooperative 
B’s. In fact, across all four conditions, between 61 and 73 percent of the third parties punish 
cooperators, and none of the small treatment differences is significant; see Figure 1. On average, 
punishment of defectors is greater than punishment of cooperators in each of the four treatments. 
However, this does not diminish the general importance of anti-social punishment because by 
decreasing the expected returns to cooperation for player B, such punishment diminishes the 
defection-deterring force of altruistic punishment.  
FIGURE 1: ANTI-SOCIAL PUNISHMENT BY THIRD PARTIES     (INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE) 
 Subjects’ verbal remarks after the experiment, when we asked them for their motives for 
punishing cooperators, indicate the spiteful nature of their punishment. We noticed very many 
statements such as “I want B to lose,” “To reduce B compared to me,” “I want to defeat B,” “I am 
jealous of B, that is why it is important to impose a loss on him,” “I want to bring down B,” 
“Imposing a loss in the game gives enjoyment,” “When somebody loses and goes home, it gives 
enjoyment,” “I wanted to destroy B”. The behavioral evidence together with the verbal 
statements provides clear evidence for the spitefulness involved in punishing cooperators.  
III. The Potential Impact of Spite on Cooperation and Coordination 
In order to study the impact of spiteful preferences on cooperation and coordination, Hoff and 
Pandey (Karla Hoff and Priyanka Pandey, 2007) conducted a stag hunt game, in which both 
mutual cooperation and mutual defection are equilibria for selfish players (see Figure 2 in which 
                                                 
4 The caste conflict hypothesis states that in the treatment with mixed caste groups, altruistic punishment will be 
higher than in the single caste group treatment (HLH > HHH and LHL > LLL). The caste submission hypothesis 
states that moral outrage and thus altruistic punishment is smaller if an H does not share with an L compared to an L 
not sharing with an L (LHL < LLL). The caste culture hypothesis states that, compared to low caste individuals, high 
caste members are more disposed to punish unfair treatment because, among other factors, a long history of denial of 
basic rights means that low caste members feel less entitled to fair treatment (HHH and HLH > LLL and LHL). 
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the equilibrium cells are shaded). The mutual cooperation equilibrium is better for both players, 
but in the case of a unilateral defection, the cooperating player earns only 3 while the defecting 
player earns 7. Inequality aversion in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. 
Schmidt, 1999) and spitefulness as defined here will increase the likelihood of choosing the 
noncooperative action in this game. If a player dislikes disadvantageous inequality, the expected 
utility of cooperation is decreased (for any interior belief about the other player’s action) since 
the outcome (3 for self, 7 for other) gives rise to a nonpecuniary disutility. In addition, if a player 
derives likes advantageous inequality, the expected utility of defection is increased (for any given 
interior belief about the other’s behavior) since he derives extra utility from being ahead in case 
that the other player cooperates and he defects. Thus, everything else equal, a spiteful player is 
more likely to choose the non-cooperative action.  
FIGURE 2: THE STAG HUNT GAME   (INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE) 
 Subjects played the game in Figure 2 ten times, using tokens that at the end of the game 
were exchanged for an equal number of rupees. During the first five periods, subjects had one 
partner. After every period, they received feedback about their partner’s choice. In periods 6-10 
subjects were paired with another partner with whom they played the game again for five periods. 
Hoff and Pandey conducted three treatments that differ only in the caste composition of pairs:  an 
LL treatment (both players from a low caste), an HH treatment, and an LH treatment. This design 
can address the question whether high caste members are more or less able than low caste 
members to coordinate on the good equilibrium and whether mixed pairings do worse.  
The results are that the high castes are much less able to coordinate on the good equilibrium 
– a difference across castes that is highly significant. In round 5,, the LL pairs obtain the good 
equilibrium in 67 percent of the cases (10/15), whereas the HH pairs obtain it in only 19 percent 
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of the cases (3/16). The HH pairs do even worse than the mixed LH pairs, who reach the good 
equilibrium in 40 percent of the cases (12/30). In the second half of the experiment, in which 
players change partners, coordination on the good equilibrium increases in all treatments, and LL 
pairs achieve the Pareto-dominant outcome in 80% of the cases (12/15). The HH pairs are still 
worst and achieve the good equilibrium in only in 47% of the cases (7/15).  
The striking difference in cooperation across castes could be due to three main sources: (i) 
High caste members could have a stronger aversion against disadvantageous inequality. (ii) High 
caste members could be more spiteful generally and more angry at “playing the fool.” (iii) They 
could have less optimistic beliefs about their partner’s willingness to cooperate. The “belief 
hypothesis” seems rather implausible because even in the final round of a game with a given 
partner, that is, after the expectations had time to converge, the high caste members cooperate 
much less. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that if the opponent cooperated in 
the first round, the high caste members compared to the low caste members are less likely to 
cooperate in the second round of the 5-round game. However, because the stag hunt game does 
not allow us to make inferences about preferences, Hoff and Pandey conducted additional 
experiments to examine potential differences in preferences across castes.  
III. Are Members of High Castes more Spiteful? 
Table 1 reports a series of binary choice dictator games that explore the prevalence of positive 
and negative inequity aversion as well as of pure spite across castes.  240 subjects participated in 
these games, each one of them making a choice in only one of the games. Each subject 
participates in one session and plays first the role of Player B (who is the dictator) in a game, and 
then the role of Player A (who is the recipient) in a different game. He does not learn that he will 
play the role of A until he has completed his role as B. Participants are divided into two groups in 
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nearby locations. Every subject in one group is randomly matched with another subject in the 
other group; the matches are independent across the two games. In order to rule out any social 
pressure, the players’ decisions were double-blind.. The protocol made it transparent that no one, 
including the experimenter, could learn the decisions of any individual player. The only thing that 
the subjects know about their partner is his caste status (high or low) and that he is from their 
village. Hoff and Pandey matched all high caste players with high caste players, and all low caste 
players with low caste players because they were interested in how the dictators behave in HH 
and LL pairs.  
For our purposes, game 2 is particularly interesting. In this game, B can decrease A’s 
payoff without cost to himself. If B does so, he reduces the total payoff and violates the equality 
norm. Forty-two percent of the high-caste members but only 21 percent of the low-caste members 
behave in this spiteful way – a difference that is significant. In game 4, player B has again a 
similar option but this time behaving spitefully is costly for B. Here we see no difference between 
the two castes, but it is still striking that roughly one third of the players in both castes prefers the 
spiteful allocation. Game 3 is also interesting because here B can escape disadvantageous 
inequality by reducing A’s payoff. In this game the high caste players again reduce A’s payoff 
more often (in 44% versus 29% of the cases) but the difference is only weakly significant.  
 
TABLE 1 - RESULTS FOR BINARY CHOICE DICTATOR GAMES 
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Game N* Payoffs (rupees for other, rupees for 
self) for left option and right option 
Fraction who choose left 
option  
p-value 
   High caste Low caste two-
sided 
one-
sided 
1 60 B chooses (90, 90) vs. (70, 100) 0.40 0.47 0.609  
2 76 B chooses (70, 90) vs. (90, 90) 0.42 0.21 0.049 0.024 
3 90 B chooses (100, 100) vs. (180, 110) 0.44 0.29 0.128 0.064 
4 60 B chooses (100, 150) vs. (160, 160) 0.30 0.33 0.785 0.40 
5 60 B chooses (160, 100) vs. (110, 110) 0.53 0.53 1.00  
6 74 B chooses (150, 120) vs. (100, 130) 0.46 0.62 0.166  
7 60 B chooses (150, 150) vs. (100, 160) 0.83 0.53 0.01  
* Bold numbers indicate the dictator’s payoff.  We report the total number of subjects. For each game, half of the 
subjects are high caste and half are low caste. Thus, for example, in game 1, there are 30 high caste subjects and 30 
low caste subjects. The two-sided p-value refers to the null hypothesis of no caste differences and is based on a t-test. 
Based on the results of the previous section, the null hypothesis for games 2-4 is that high castes are more spiteful or 
more willing to pay to reduce disadvantageous inequality; therefore we added one-sided p-values for these games.  
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In games 5-7, B can sacrifice 10 rupees for the sake of increasing his partner’s payoff by 50 
rupees. In games 5 and 6, sacrificing leaves the dictator with a lower payoff than his partner. In 
game 7, sacrificing leaves the dictator with the same payoff as his partner. The high caste is more 
likely to sacrifice to help his partner in game 7 (83 percent are willing to sacrifice) than in games 
5 and 6 (about 50 percent are willing to sacrifice). The p-value of the difference in proportions of 
game 7 vs. games 6 and 5 is 0.06. In contrast, the fraction of the low caste subjects who are 
willing to sacrifice to help their partners is about the same across the three games (53 percent 
sacrifice in game 7, whereas on average 57 percent sacrifice in games 5 and 6). Logit regressions 
based on all data in Table 1 permit estimation  of the “average” aversion against disadvantageous 
inequality and against advantageous inequality with caste-specific parameters.5 The results 
indicate that both high and low caste subjects value the recipient’s payoff significantly positively 
if ahead ( > 0), and that there are no significant caste differences. However, if a dictator’s payoff 
is lower than the recipient’s payoff, the high caste subjects value the recipient’s payoff highly and 
significantly negatively ( < 0), while the low caste subjects even care positively for the other’s 
payoff ( > 0) although this parameter is not significant.  
To summarize, these results show that on average high caste subjects value others’ payoff 
strongly negatively if they experience disadvantageous disutility and in some circumstances 
(Game 2), the prevalence of spiteful preferences is much larger among high caste subjects. Taken 
together these results provide a plausible rationale for the lower ability of high caste subjects to 
cooperate and coordinate on superior equilibria.  
                                                 
5 In the spirit of Charness and Rabin (2002), the following utility function provides the basis for the logit 
estimates: UB = [1-]B  + A if B < A and UB = [1-]B + A if B ≥  A. This is equivalent to a Fehr-
Schmidt utility function UB = B  – (A – B) if B < A and UB =B – (B – A) if B ≥ A because  =  
and  = - .  
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
Spiteful preferences may constitute a considerable obstacle for trade, cooperation and, thus, 
development. In this short paper, we documented a surprisingly large amount of spiteful behavior 
in experiments conducted in India. A large majority of subjects punishes cooperative behavior in 
a one-shot trust game, although such punishment increases inequality and decreases the total 
payoff of both subjects. Evidence in dictator games suggests that high-caste subjects (compared 
to low-caste subjects) are considerably more likely to reduce others’ payoffs if behind or to take 
other spiteful actions. In addition, high caste subjects are strikingly less capable of coordinating 
on welfare-improving equilibria. We believe that this lower ability to cooperate may be due to the 
high caste subjects’ concern for status and superiority and their strong aversion against 
disadvantageous inequality. Because extreme social hierarchies are typically accompanied by a 
culture that stresses status-seeking, it is a plausible hypothesis that the observed social preference 
patterns are at least partly shaped by this culture. Thus, an exciting question for future research is 
the extent to which different institutions and cultures produce preferences that are conducive or 
detrimental to economic development.  
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